Unlike textbook arbitrageurs who instantaneously trade when prices deviate from fundamental values, real world arbitrageurs must overcome various frictions. For example, they often invest other peoples' money, resulting in a principal/agent problem that is exacerbated in market downturns. Rather than increasing investment levels when prices dip below fundamental values, arbitrageurs may, in the face of investor redemptions, sell cheap securities causing prices to decline further. As a result, mispricings can be large and can extend for long periods of time.
little change in overall fundamentals. As a result, other hedge funds incurred large losses and were also forced to sell their convertible bond holdings. In both cases, it took several months for traders to increase their capital, or for better-capitalized traders to enter.
We also study merger targets during the 1987 market crash. Merger arbitrageurs buy shares of target firms following merger announcements, providing liquidity to shareholders who choose to sell. The market crash and concurrently proposed antitakeover legislation caused merger spreads (the difference between the acquirer's offer and the target price) to widen substantially, inflicting large losses on arbitrageurs. Data from Wall Street proprietary arbitrage desks show that Wall Street firms quickly reduced their exposures by selling target stocks. Furthermore, numerous arbitrage funds and Wall Street trading desks were forced to cease operations. Despite the fact that deal flow did not decline, spreads remained wide for several months, arguably caused by capital withdrawals from the market as natural liquidity providers became short-term liquidity demanders.
Our findings do not support the frictionless economic paradigm. Under this paradigm, a shock to the capital of a subset of agents that is relatively small should have a trivial effect on security prices since new capital would immediately flow into the market and prices would be bid up to fundamental values. Rather, the findings support an alternative view that market frictions are of first order importance. Indeed, shocks to capital matter if arbitrageurs with losses face the prospect of investor redemptions (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ), particularly when margin constraints become binding during liquidity crises (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2006) ), and when other agents lack both infrastructure and information, to trade the affected securities (Merton (1987) ).
I. Convertible Bond Arbitrage: Capital Redemptions in 2005
Convertible bonds (corporate bonds with a call option on the underlying shares) are a capital source for many firms. Corporate capital needs are often immediate, and are facilitated by convertible arbitrage funds which account for up to 75% of the convertible market. Because the payoff of a convertible can be nearly replicated using other traded securities, its fundamental value can be inferred from the prices of those other securities. on credit default swaps, straight debt yields, investment bank estimates, and bond ratings, and (d) the term structure of interest rates. To mitigate the impact of outliers, we focus on the median discount of market price to theoretical value. We also limit the sample to convertible securities where the underlying stock price is at least 65% of the bond's conversion price since focusing on the more equity-sensitive part of the convertible universe mitigates errors associated with inaccurate credit spread estimates. standard deviations from the average. It was the largest deviation from theoretical value 6 Interestingly, the large hedge fund Amaranth Advisors which is shutting down after losing $6 billion from energy bets, sold more than half of its convertible book after convertibles reached their cheapest level. 7 Funds often report their holdings with the SEC under a different entity name than the fund name, thereby making it difficult to locate all of the funds, especially those which have liquidated and are no longer in business.
since LTCM began liquidating its convertible portfolio in August 1998. As shown, the discount to theoretical value reaches maximums around the deadlines for investor redemption notices, namely 45 days before the end of June and 45 days before the end of
December. When LTCM experienced large losses on its macroeconomic bets, it was forced to liquidate investments across markets, even those in which fundamentals had not changed.
As shown in Figure 3 , LTCM's liquidation of its convertible bond portfolio caused bond prices to fall which in turn caused other hedge funds to sell their convertible holdings.
Using a proprietary dataset, we examine a large portfolio of convertible bonds during the LTCM crisis. Employing a methodology similar to that used to examine the 2005 episode, we document that convertible bond prices fell dramatically, eventually reaching a discount to theoretical value of more than 4% (nearly four standard deviations from the historical distribution's average). As in 2005, it took several months before bond prices returned to more normal levels and equilibrium was restored.
II. Merger Arbitrage and the Stock Market Crash of 1987
Merger arbitrage is a strategy which seeks to capture the difference (deal spread)
between the stock price of a target firm and the offer price by the acquirer. After a merger announcement, the target's stock price usually appreciates considerably (20-30%), but then trades at a small discount to the offer price until deal completion. Mutual funds and other investors that hold the target stock sell their shares soon after the announcement. By selling, they insure against losses in case the deal is not consummated. While the probability of failure is usually small, losses conditional on failure can be large. Investors often lose the entire merger premium realized at deal announcement, and can even suffer additional losses if, following deal cancellation, the target stock trades below its pre-announcement price. By purchasing target shares after merger announcements, merger arbitrageurs provide insurance against deal failure.
In a cash merger, the arbitrageur buys the target stock and holds it until merger consummation with the expectation of realizing the difference between the offer price and the current price. In a stock merger, the arbitrageur sells short the acquirer stock to eliminate market risk. Given that the return can be locked in by the arbitrageur, and since the deal failure risk is typically idiosyncratic and thus diversifiable, merger arbitrage is viewed as a market neutral strategy. However, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) find that mergers are more likely to fail in the event of severe market downturns and propose a non-linear asset pricing model to estimate the risk and return to merger arbitrage. They create a portfolio of merger arbitrage investments and document that in most months the merger arbitrage portfolio exhibits systematic risk close to zero, but in severely declining markets, the market beta of merger arbitrage increases to 0.50. Figure 4 displays daily merger arbitrage median spreads and returns for a portfolio of merger deals involving U.S. publicly-traded targets during the crash of 1987.
On October 1, 1987, the median spread for the sample of 107 ongoing merger deals was 3.3%. During the period October 14-16, the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee proposed legislation to ban leveraged buyouts and hostile mergers as analyzed by Mitchell and Netter (1989) . By October 16, in response to the proposed legislation, the median deal spread had increased to 5.4%. During the stock market crash on October 19
and 20, 1987, the median spread increased to 9.7% and 15.1%, respectively, as the arbitrage community expected the termination or revision of many of the ongoing merger transactions. 9 As shown in Figure 4 , this dramatic increase in deal spreads caused severely negative returns to merger arbitrage portfolios.
Figure 4 also displays trading activity of 18 anonymous merger arbitrage desks from major Wall Street firms. 10 For the month of October 1987 (the only month for which the data was provided), we display net purchases as a percent of the total long portfolio value aggregated across the 18 trading desks. These desks owned more than 10% of the total value of takeover targets as of the beginning of October and thus were influential in setting deal spreads. During the October 1-13 period, the 18 desks were net 9 Many NASDAQ stocks did not trade on October 19, and thus the October 20 spread better reflects the impact of the market crash on merger arbitrage. 10 The data was collected at the request of Mitchell and Netter (1989) while at the SEC. The data are deemed by the NYSE to be confidential in their entirety and confidential treatment has been requested by the NYSE in a letter dated February 10, 1988, which has been filed pursuant to 17 CRF 200.83(e) with the Freedom of Information Act Officer at the SEC.
purchasers of target shares. Beginning October 14, contemporaneous with the proposed anti-takeover legislation, the desks began to reduce their positions. They accelerated their selling on October 19 reducing their holdings by 6%, and then sold more than 12% of their positions on October 20 th . Interestingly, these desks continued as net sellers every day during the remainder of the month, despite a 5% stock market rebound and an indication by Congress that the anti-takeover legislation proposal would be rescinded.
We believe that the continued selling pressure from the proprietary desks was caused by internal capital constraints that were likely imposed as a result of the large losses.
Indeed, many proprietary merger arbitrage trading desks shuttered operations in the aftermath of the crash and several arbitrage funds also shut down.
Whereas merger arbitrageurs typically serve a function of providing liquidity to target shareholders, they instead became liquidity demanders resulting in a substantial dislocation in merger stocks. Because deal flow remained robust following the crash, there was an opportunity for surviving desks and a few well-capitalized entrants to invest in merger stocks at very attractive spreads (for example, Warren Buffet entered the merger arbitrage market for a brief period after the crash). These investors realized stellar returns over the next year, until capital flowed back into the market and arbitrage spreads returned to more normal levels.
III. Discussion: The Speed of Arbitrage
We arguably document major and persistent price deviations from fundamental value, suggesting that while arbitrage is reasonably fast when market participants are not capital constrained, it can be slow following major capital dislocations. Convertible arbitrageurs provide immediate liquidity to firms unable to raise cash efficiently via the equity or straight debt markets. In return, these arbitrageurs receive a premium for holding a security which is highly illiquid. Likewise, merger arbitrageurs provide immediate liquidity to investors seeking to divest target shares after a merger announcement, and in return, receive a premium for bearing deal failure risk. However, in situations where external capital shocks force liquidity providers to reverse order and become liquidity demanders, it can take months to restore equilibrium to the dislocated market. This is because it is costly to maintain dormant capital, infrastructure, and talent for long periods of time, while waiting for a profitable opportunities. Furthermore, uncertainty over the distribution of possible outcomes expands the barrier that separates investors (principals) from money mangers (agents). The result is that profit opportunities for unconstrained firms can persist for months. Given the relative ease of estimating deviations from fundamentals in the convertible and merger markets, the time required to restore equilibrium is likely to be longer in other markets. We view our analysis as evidence that real world frictions cause capital to move slowly. 
